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Few developing countries have succeeded in consistently closing the 
income gap with the world’s richest nations without proactive government 
action in pursuit of economic transformation and a dynamic role in the 
global economy. Two factors are crucial here: the development and 
implementation of a medium- and long-term strategy to achieve rapid 
economic transformation, and the support provided to this strategy by a 
public-private alliance forged by means of a social process suited to local 
conditions. This article analyses the way alliances of this kind operate in 
10 countries outside the region deemed to be successful because they 
have achieved a process of convergence with the developed countries or 
performed better than those of Latin America and the Caribbean, despite 
having similar resource endowments. One element that is lacking in the 
region, or at best is only incipient, is public-private collaboration. Thus, 
the aim of the analysis is to prompt reflection about the kind of alliances 
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The six-year period from 2003 to 2008 was a relatively 
prosperous one for Latin America and the Caribbean 
following the lost decade of  the 1980s and the 
region’s recovery from successive cyclical shocks in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this expansionary 
phase, the region’s economy grew by an average 
of 5% a year and per capita income by 3%, while 
employment and poverty indicators also improved 
(eclac, 2008a). This was an unprecedentedly good 
economic performance, at least by the standards of 
the past 40 years (eclac, 2008b).
However, this performance needs to be taken 
in a broader context. First of all, about a third of 
the growth was due to external factors (idb, 2008). 
Secondly, it was hardly spectacular compared to that 
of other developing regions (see table 1). A study 
by eclac (2008c) singles out the factors behind 
the relative underperformance of  Latin America 
and the Caribbean, pointing to shortcomings with 
productivity, investment and economic transformation 
and to a lacklustre external trade performance.
Future developments in the global economy, 
furthermore, are expected to be less favourable to 
growth in the region. For one thing, it is going 
to have to cope with a deep recession, the worst 
since the Second World War, and while some are 
forecasting a recovery in 2010, this will be modest 
and hesitant (imf, 2009). For another, even assuming 
recovery does take place, there are organizations such 
as the World Bank that do not expect global growth 
I
introduction
  The authors appreciate the valuable colaboration of Raúl 
Holz in this research.
TABLE 1
Growth rates in developing countries
(Percentage variation in constant 2000 dollars)
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 (ranking) (ranking) (ranking) (ranking) (ranking)
East Asia 10.1 (1) 10.5 (1) 8.5 (1) 6.7 (1) 7.8 (1)
 China 11.6 11.9 9.4 7.5 8.5
 Indonesia 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.4 6.0
 Thailand 5.1 4.8 4.6 3.6 5.0
Europe and Central Asia 7.5 (3) 7.1 (3) 5.3 (5) 2.7 (5) 5.0 (5)
 Poland 6.2 6.6 5.4 4.0 4.7
 Russian Federation 7.4 8.1 6.0 3.0 5.0
 Turkey 6.9 4.6 3.0 1.7 4.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.6 (5) 5.7 (6) 4.4 (6) 2.1 (6) 4.0 (6)
 Argentina 8.5 8.7 6.6 1.5 4.0
 Brazil 3.8 5.4 5.2 2.8 4.6
 Mexico 4.9 3.2 2.0 1.1 3.1
Middle East and North Africa 5.3 (6) 5.8 (5) 5.8 (3) 3.9 (4) 5.2 (4)
 Algeria 1.8 3.1 4.9 3.8 5.4
 Egypt 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.5 6.0
 Islamic Republic of  Iran 5.9 7.8 5.6 3.5 4.2
South Asia 9.0 (2) 8.4 (2) 6.3 (2) 5.4 (2) 7.2 (2)
 Bangladesh 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.7 6.2
 India 9.7 9.0 6.3 5.8 7.7
 Pakistan 6.2 6.0 6.0 3.0 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.9 (4) 6.3 (4) 5.4 (4) 4.6 (3) 5.8 (3)
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Washington, D.C., 2008.
97
PubLIC-PRIVATE ALLIAnCEs foR Long-TERm nATIonAL dEVELoPmEnT sTRATEgIEs  •  RobERT dEVLIn And gRACIELA moguILLAnsky
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
to be as strong as in recent years (World Bank, 2008). 
Lastly, the same source indicates that, for a variety 
of  reasons, there are no grounds for expecting a 
medium- and long-term commodity price boom as 
beneficial as the one that recently took place.
Thus, for all its progress in consolidating 
democracy, implementing structural reforms and 
restoring economic growth, the region has fallen 
behind in other aspects of development, while the 
external factors contributing to its “satisfactory” 
performance may soon be a thing of the past.
It is urgent for the region to find a path to 
consistently high growth rates that enable it to 
converge with the wealthier countries of the world 
and dramatically reduce poverty. The history of 
development indicates that this is a very difficult task, 
but not impossible. Indeed, a significant number of 
economies have caught up to a great degree, with 
some even joining the club of developed countries. 
This obviously stands in marked contrast to the 
experience of  Latin America and the Caribbean 
(see figure 1).
Those countries succeeded because of  a 
combination of  domestic and external factors, 
most of  which reflected the particular situation 
of  each. Nonetheless, there was one common 
factor: the proactive attitude of government, which 
fostered development by effectively implementing 
an internationally oriented medium- and long-term 
national economic transformation strategy. These 
strategies were organized within the framework of 
a public-private alliance. Since this is a missing or 
only very incipient element in the economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the present article will 
examine it in greater detail with the aim of prompting 
reflection about the development of  a similar 
economic policy for the region.1 The current crisis 
makes this process of reflection even more necessary. 
Short-term adjustments will be inevitable in the 
coming months, but they should be made as part of 
a more comprehensive approach, i.e., in the context 
of  a medium- and long-term strategy. Otherwise, 
there is the risk of creating inconsistencies and even 
contradictions between adjustment policies and the 
conditions needed for productive transformation and 
upgrading of economies, as happened in the 1980s.
1 The analysis is based on a forthcoming book by Devlin and 
Moguillansky (2009).
FIGURE 1
Per capita income in selected countries and regions
(Percentages, high per capita income countries = 100)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  World Bank data.
N.B.: oecd = rich countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, fin = Finland, irl = Ireland, rk = 
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The article is organized as follows. After this 
introduction, it first analyses the character of 
development strategies and the way these have evolved 
in certain successful countries outside the region studied 
by the authors as part of a research project. It then 
goes on to review the nature of the different public-
private alliances on which these countries’ approaches 
to development have been based. Lastly, it examines an 
example of a long-term public-private alliance, that of 
Ireland, leaving the final section for conclusions.
II
Strategies to promote economic
transformation and internationalization
1. The character of development strategies
Overtly or tacitly, governments usually have a 
development strategy. A strategy is a template for 
action or simply a plan to attain particular goals. 
Development strategies can have very different 
characteristics, however. To simplify, strategies may 
be said to be differentiated chiefly by the amount of 
public intervention in pursuit of the goals set, and 
by the emphasis put on accelerating the market’s 
pace of economic transformation.
On the one hand, there are strategies that 
focus on public-sector interventions to strengthen 
the autonomous action of market forces, examples 
being monetary and fiscal policies compatible with 
macroeconomic stability, protection for property rights 
and the legal institutions underpinning them, external 
trade and investment liberalization and certain basic 
public goods such as education and infrastructure. 
This approach bespeaks confidence that the free 
play of market forces will solve economic problems 
and that a “sound” macroeconomic policy generates 
sufficient incentives for businesses themselves to lead 
a process of economic transformation based on the 
country’s international comparative advantages. 
In consequence, the scope and goals of  public 
interventions are relatively limited and they are kept 
at arm’s length from the workings of  the market. 
To act otherwise would only create distortions that 
interfered with growth and development.
At the other extreme are strategies that are 
mistrustful of certain market signals and question 
whether static comparative advantages by themselves 
can drive economic transformation rapidly enough 
to bring about convergence with developed countries. 
This approach recognizes that short-term signals can 
be very unreliable guides to the optimum allocation 
of resources, so that transformation opportunities 
in turn cannot be exploited to the fullest.2 Public-
sector intervention should thus aim directly at 
rectifying them. The most common problems 
include externalities, uncertainty, non-availability 
of  information and lack of  coordination between 
different actors in the market.
From this second standpoint, the goal of 
public-sector actions and initiatives is to “distort” 
some short-term market signals —particularly 
microeconomic ones— and thereby encourage 
firms to take measures aimed at the medium- and 
long-term creation of new comparative advantages 
based on production processes with greater value 
added and technology content. In other words, 
some efficiency in the allocation of  resources in 
certain activities or sectors is sacrificed to stimulate 
economic transformation (unctad, 2006). As Evans 
(1995) argues, an approach of  this kind reveals a 
magnified concern with a country’s ranking in the 
global economic hierarchy, on the assumption that 
this is not irremediably fixed by the existing structure 
of  static comparative advantages but that there is 
scope for public interventions to begin upgrading the 
economy or accelerate the process of transformation. 
Furthermore, this perspective is more relevant than 
ever now that production processes are globalized 
and services are being traded on a massive scale.
In point of  fact, countries’ strategies have 
not strictly followed either of  the approaches 
described, but contain elements of  both (Evans, 
1995; Ul Haque, 2007). What is at issue, rather, are 
2 As Rodrik (2008a) notes, the new growth theory recognizes the 
existence of multiple market failures, as does the new trade theory. 
See also Lall (2000).
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the mechanisms used and the dominant approach 
in the orientation of  public policies. Nonetheless, 
there is an ongoing debate between proponents 
of  the first alternative, known as “monetarist” in 
the 1960s and “neoliberal” at present, and of  the 
second, which was formerly called “structuralist” 
and now goes under the name of “neostructuralism” 
or “industrial policy”.3 It should be said that while 
the contemporary debate originated with the famous 
disagreement between monetarists and structuralists 
in the import substitution industrialization period, 
the proponents of neostructuralism and industrial 
policies have brought a great deal of “value added” 
to the discussion. In any event, the academic debate 
about which of these approaches would be best for 
economic growth remains unresolved, since there 
are serious methodological obstacles to obtaining 
the formal evidence needed to support one position 
or the other (Rodrik, 2008a).4
Given the lack of conclusive empirical evidence, 
in the present study we have opted simply to “bet” that 
the second approach in its modern version is far more 
relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean. First, 
because few countries have industrialized without an 
active strategy of public policy intervention (Chang, 
2003). Second, because among the few countries 
that have succeeded in significantly closing the 
income gap with the rich world over the past 50 
years, a large number did so by proactively working 
towards industrial transformation, including dynamic 
internationalization of  the economy. Many case 
studies also suggest that a proactive medium- and 
long-term strategy can help to bring about this 
transformation.5 Lastly, Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been among the regions that have 
most closely followed the neoliberal prescriptions 
of the Washington Consensus but, as we saw earlier, 
without distinguishing itself  in terms of the growth 
of developing countries.
2. Development strategies in practice
Table 2 presents the 10 countries included in our 
research into the factors determining the success 
3 Rodrik (2008a) gives an overview of the debate.
4 The same problem exists with regard to the effects of  trade 
liberalization and even of  exports on productivity and growth 
(Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000; wto, 2008).
5 Most such studies evaluate the successful experience of  East 
Asia. See, for example, Wade (1990), Evans (1995) and Amsden 
(1989).
of strategies and the effectiveness of policies. Five 
of them (Finland, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Spain) are members of a group of 
10 countries (out of a universe of 206) which closed 
the income gap with the United States by more than 
10 points between 1960 and 2005. The other five 
were Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway and Portugal.6 In 
addition, two countries in our project, the Czech 
Republic and Malaysia, closed the gap to a lesser 
degree. Australia and particularly New Zealand have 
lost ground in the convergence process, but they 
have fared better than Latin American countries 
that are similarly reliant on natural resources. All 
the countries in table 2 other than Australia, New 
Zealand and Sweden were relatively or very poor 
after the Second World War.
To illustrate the different orientations, table 3 
summarizes the evolving export development strategies 
of four of the 10 countries in the study.7 Those of 
Finland and Singapore can be characterized by their 
structural nature, i.e., they have explicit targets for 
economic transformation where what is pursued is 
a dynamic of internationalization underpinned by 
direct, proactive public policy action. Also included 
were Australia and New Zealand, whose strategies 
shifted towards a neoliberal approach in the 1980s, 
although in the present decade the latter country 
has striven, with considerable difficulty, to apply 
economic transformation measures.8
A good number of these countries have actively 
pursued economic transformation strategies by 
developing formal multi-year plans of national scope 
(see table 4). These plans are important because 
they help to ensure that the strategy is integrated 
into the official and public domains, facilitating 
accountability and orienting the implementation 
and allocation of resources in accordance with the 
priorities laid down.
6 Taiwan Province of China does not appear in the World Bank 
database of 206 countries.
7 In the interests of  a focused analysis, the research concentrated 
on export development strategies (a cornerstone of  all the 
strategies), which encompass four main aspects: efforts to 
attract foreign direct investment (fdi), the internationalization 
of  small and medium-sized enterprises (smes), innovation and 
export promotion.
8 The Czech Republic (from 2000 onward), Ireland, Malaysia, the 
Republic of Korea and Sweden all took an economic transformation 
approach. Spain is an intermediate case: while a quite liberal strategy 
is applied at the national level, the autonomous communities 
have implemented what are clearly economic transformation 
strategies.
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TABLE 2
Per capita income in selected countries as a proportion of per capita income in the 
United Statesa
(Percentages, United States per capita income = 100)
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s (first half)
Australia 63.7 64.4 61.4 60.2 62.1
Finland 54.1 64.4 69.9 65.0 70.6
Ireland 36.6 41.3 43.8 57.0 78.7
Rep. of  Korea 8.3 12.4 18.0 28.5 34.4
Malaysia 5.7 6.9 8.4 10.8 11.5
New Zealand 56.9 52.4 46.4 40.8 40.8
Czech Rep.    16.7 17.2
Singapore 17.8 31.4 44.5 60.6 67.4
Spain 32.1 40.0 38.0 40.5 42.5
Sweden 83.7 87.3 84.5 78.2 80.6
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  World Bank data.
a Constant 2000 dollars.
TABLE 3
Selected countries: milestones in national development strategies





policy and trade liberalization
2000 
Efforts to spur innovation and 
attract fdi
Finland 1970
N a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e -
intensive industrialization. 
Protectionism and subsidies 
for fledgling industries. 
Constant  emphas is  on 
education
1993
Entry into the European Union. 
Liberalization of  trade and 
external capital, including fdi, 
and greater attention to long-
term microeconomic trends. 
Strengthening and coordination 
of  industry and the innovation 
system to move towards an 
innovation society. Research and 
development approach oriented 
by the dynamism of industry
2006
Strengthening of  the renewal of 
the innovation system. Increase in 
the knowledge base. Improvements 
in science and technology research 











Economic transformation agenda 
centred on globally competitive 
firms, world quality infrastructure, 
support  for innovation and 
productivity,  environmental 
sustainability and promotion of 
Auckland as a globally competitive 
city.
Singapore 1965
I m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n 
industrialization. Exports 
of  light manufactures and 
efforts to attract fdi.
1979
Policy of  orientation towards 
medium- and high-technology 
industry and services. Wage 
increases in labour-intensive 
sectors as an incentive to achieve 
the above goal.
1990 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f 
manufacturing into neighbouring 
countries, followed by expansion 
into China, India and the Middle 
East. Begins to develop industrial 
and services clusters, including 
partially State-owned local firms. 
Development of  a financial and 
business services platform.
2000 
Development of existing industrial 
clusters and identification and 
development of  new sectors by 
attracting investment, supporting 
innovative firms and developing 
technology in old sectors and a 
selected number of non-traditional 
s e c t o r s  w i t h  d eve l o p m e n t 
potential. Internationalization 
o f  s m e s.  Creat ion  o f  new 
geographical spaces for investment 
and export.
Source: Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky, “Fomentando tigres latinoamericanos: principios para una visión estratégica 
nacional en el marco de alianzas públicas-privadas”, Santiago, Chile, 2009, unpublished.
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The strategies of countries where public policies 
actively promote economic transformation have 
certain features in common. For example, the highest 
importance is given to macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
soundness, consistently high investment rates and 
dynamic internationalization of the economy. Given 
the growing importance of innovation, all the countries 
have given priority to human development, including 
education, with ever-increasing efforts to expand 
higher education coverage. Although the exploitation 
of static comparative advantages is a starting point for 
export development, they have all made determined 
efforts to create new advantages over time so that 
external sales can be continually upgraded. Diagram 1
shows the paradigmatic case of the Republic of Korea. 
Furthermore, the upgrading strategy is dynamic and 
adapted to local and external conditions. Where 
public policies are concerned, a “neutral” horizontal 
TABLE 4
National plans in selected countries
Republic of  Korea (up to 1993) Five-year plans 
Republic of  Korea (1997 onward) National plans discontinued, but indicative planning takes place within each ministry
Finland Three-year plans
Ireland Six- to seven-year plans
Malaysia Complementary and interactive indicative plans including a 30-year vision, a 10-year 
framework plan and a five-year plan
Czech Republic (before 1990) Central planning
Czech Republic (since 1990) Three-year plans
Source: Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky, “Fomentando tigres latinoamericanos: principios para una visión estratégica 
nacional en el marco de alianzas públicas-privadas”, Santiago, Chile, 2009, unpublished.
DIAGRAM 1
Republic of korea: development of principal industries
Source: Yoo Soo Hong, “Public and private sector alliances for innovation and economic development: the Korean case”, document 
presented at the seminar “Public-private partnerships for innovation and export development” (Seville, 13 and 14 September 2008) held 
by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) and the Ibero-American Secretariat (segib), 2008.
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Development strategies with a proactive economic 
transformation approach start with a diagnosis 
and evaluation of key opportunities for improving 
the country’s positioning in the global market, 
involving a medium- and long-term projection and 
the identification of  primary constraints needing 
to be overcome, mitigated or removed if  these 
opportunities are to be capitalized upon (Stiglitz, 
1998). Obviously, this evaluation and the goals set 
need to be based on empirical evidence about the 
capabilities of the economy and short-, medium- and 
long-term trends in the external environment. As for 
public policies and programmes to deal with these 
primary constraints, they need to take account of the 
real situation of the country, the capabilities of the 
public and private sectors and the measures that will 
most encourage the private sector to take decisions 
compatible with the goals of the strategy concerned. 
Macroeconomic goals and programmes also need 
to be aligned with those aimed at specific activities 
or sectors so that market signals and government 
incentives can be combined in a consistent way.
How can this task be undertaken? Today, by 
contrast with the decades immediately following 
the Second World War, the production apparatus 
in most countries is in private-sector hands. 
Consequently, it is private firms that must provide 
market information which, however incomplete, 
can serve to identify trade opportunities and the 
obstacles (including public policy-related ones) to 
economic transformation.11 However, firms can be 
short-sighted when it comes to taking decisions and 
measures that might yield better performance. This 
is because of the externalities and “market failures” 
mentioned above, which are especially important 
in a fast-changing globalized world: first mover 
advantages, optimum coordination of the business 
world, appropriation of the benefits of innovation 
and technological development, etc.12
Although governments also have shortcomings 
and do not necessarily have better information 
than the private sector, their political leadership can 
stimulate proactive and forward-looking strategic 
thinking about the country’s needs and coordinate 
collective actions in pursuit of the public good. Thus, 
when both sides are working together it is possible 
to enhance their separate potential for supporting 
mechanisms and programmes that can identify and 
deal with primary market failures, as well as failures 
deriving from public regulation and planning policies 
themselves. In short, collective thinking is usually more 
intelligent than isolated individual approaches.
The neostructuralist approach adds some 
important requirements, however. First and foremost, 
III
Proactive economic transformation strategies: 
the role of public-private alliances
approach is combined with selective interventions to 
stimulate strategic sectors and activities.9
Lastly, a characteristic that can be observed in 
the evolution of strategies in all the countries, albeit 
much more clearly in some like the Czech Republic 
and New Zealand, is the tendency for past practices 
to be maintained even when better alternatives are 
available (path dependency). This has been made 
manifest by the difficulty experienced in switching 
from the relatively neoliberal strategy promoted from 
1984 and 1990, respectively, to a more structuralist 
one in the 2000s.10
10 See Haworth (2008) and Benáček (2008).
11 Depending on the development level of  the country’s economy 
and its position in the cycle, the primary constraints on sustained 
growth may be concentrated in the macro-, meso- or microeconomic 
spheres. Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) have come up 
with some ideas for diagnosing the subject systematically and 
setting priorities.
12 Fajnzylber (1990) points out that economic transformation 
failures can be particularly damaging in natural resource-based 
economies.
9 Hausmann and Rodrik (2006) showed that upgrading export 
activity while continually adding value was vital to rising incomes 
and convergence. Owing to market failures, however, this does not 
come about spontaneously. Furthermore, some export development 
paths are more propitious than others. Because of this, and because 
governments have limited resources for promoting development, 
public policies are “doomed” to be selective.
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public-private alliances can only be an effective tool 
of  development strategy if  the State collaborates 
closely with the private sector but retains a degree of 
autonomy in relation to the public good, or what Evans 
(1995) calls “embedded autonomy”. Only then can it 
be a full partner for the private sector, but avoiding 
“capture” by special interests. The second point is 
that both attaining this autonomy and developing 
an effective economic transformation strategy depend 
on the institutional design of  a social process of 
public-private collaboration that yields the information 
needed to identify socially beneficial opportunities and 
deal with the primary constraints of new production 
activities, but without capture of the State.
It should also be pointed out that some of 
the information needed to produce diagnoses and 
create intelligent strategies is in the hands of other 
non-commercial agents such as academia (including 
researchers) and unions.
If  strategies and financial support for them13 
are to put down deep political roots that endure 
over the medium and long term, it will be necessary 
to develop consensus or something approaching 
it, or at least forge a public understanding. This 
is why alliances often have to include groups from 
outside the business sector.14 In any event, the mere 
fact of  “working together” within an institutional 
framework designed in the light of the considerations 
discussed here is itself  a social process that can lead 
to the creation of consensuses providing the basis 
for a development strategy which transcends political 
cycles (Stiglitz, 1998).
IV
The field of action of public-private alliances
1. A framework of analysis
Diagram 2 provides a stylized description of  the 
field of  action of  public-private alliances. The 
left-hand column offers a schematic representation 
of  how their members work together to build a 
development strategy. It should be stressed that 
the development of alliances of this type, and the 
role they play in formulating and implementing 
the strategies concerned, depend greatly on the 
particular political, historical and cultural context 
of  the country concerned.15 There are countries 
where something like a true public consensus can 
be reached because this context combines favourably 
with propitious economic conditions and effective 
institutions capable of  processing the interaction 
of participants within the alliance. In other cases, 
the nature of the political context may mean that 
the alliance is viewed merely as the expression of a 
public understanding or passive acceptance of the 
development strategy. One way or another, though, 
the degree of  agreement among the participants 
in the alliance will condition the extent to which a 
particular strategy is developed and applied.
When it comes to forging consensus and 
understandings, interaction between the parties in 
a public-private alliance can vary in both form and 
scope. The left-hand vertical axis of diagram 2 shows 
that the discussion between the public and private 
sectors may vary along a non-discrete scale reflecting 
different characteristics of the interaction between 
the two, ranging from a true dialogue that yields 
consensus to government consultation of the private 
sector that helps produce a public understanding or 
to what is basically imposition of the strategy without 
much public consultation or dialogue, but with some 
degree of  understanding between the parties. The 
scope of  social participation in the alliance also 
varies. The horizontal axis of  diagram 2 shows 
that this may range from a trilateral relationship 
13 If  public acceptance of  a strategy is too low, allocating 
resources to implement it causes strains. For example, public 
spending on research and development and innovation may be 
unpopular compared to other alternatives like poverty reduction 
programmes. Thus, it may be necessary to build up an explicit 
public consensus or understanding to ensure that the former is 
consistently provided for in the budget.
14 As Prats i Català (2005) points out, however, weaker sectors 
may need support if  they are to participate effectively in the 
dialogue.
15 In the words of a joint study by the World Bank, the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(World Bank/idea/eclac, 2005, p. 11): “The process of  building 
a national Vision does not have a unique format but must be 
adapted to the country situation and to the particularities of 
the participating stakeholders.”
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between government, firms and academia to a very 
broad alliance encompassing practically all major 
representative groups in society.
Lastly, account needs to be taken of  a third 
aspect not included in diagram 2: the operating 
structure of  public-private alliances. Here, the 
following stylized variants can be identified: (i) those 
functioning through formal, explicit structures, (ii) 
those that have a formal structure but emerge ad 
hoc and (iii) alliances operating through informal 
networks or tacit agreements. In practice, all three 
structures must be present, or coexist, in any 
public-private alliance. However, one or two may 
be expected to predominate.
2. Alliances in practice
In the countries studied, we found the following 
dominant structures:
 Structured formal: Finland, Ireland and 
Singapore.
 Ad hoc formal: Australia (e.g., committees and 
councils focused on specific tasks).
 Tacit/informal: Spain and Sweden.
 Hybrid (two or more of  the above): Czech 
Republic, Malaysia, New Zealand and Republic 
of Korea.
Using this classification of  countries by the 
structure of  their public-private alliance and the 
real scope of  interaction as indicated in diagram 
3, the nature of national alliances in the countries 
studied can be described. In Ireland and Finland, for 
example, they are characterized by their breadth and 
formal structuring. They are a real force in strategy 
development and implementation throughout much of 
the public-sector hierarchy, they give rise to a genuine 
social dialogue, and the agreements reached are close 
to being consensuses transcending political cycles. 
Accordingly, these countries belong to Area 1 of 
diagram 3, with alliances encompassing government, 
firms, unions, academia and, in the case of Ireland, 
non-governmental organizations (ngos).16
DIAGRAM 2
Scope of public-private alliances
Source: Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky, “Fomentando tigres latinoamericanos: principios para una visión estratégica 
nacional en el marco de alianzas públicas-privadas”, Santiago, Chile, 2009, unpublished.
























PubLIC-PRIVATE ALLIAnCEs foR Long-TERm nATIonAL dEVELoPmEnT sTRATEgIEs  •  RobERT dEVLIn And gRACIELA moguILLAnsky
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
Singapore also has a fairly broad and well-
structured public-private alliance that is involved 
in formulating and implementing the development 
strategy at different levels of  the public-sector 
hierarchy. That of Malaysia has similar characteristics, 
although without union involvement.17 In both 
countries, however, the government undertakes 
extensive consultations (rather than dialogues) 
with its partners, after which it takes decisions 
and announces strategies, so that what emerges is 
a public understanding rather than a consensus as 
such. The characteristics of their alliances place the 
two countries in Area 3 of diagram 3.
One aspect that should be highlighted in the 
four countries mentioned, particularly Ireland and 
Singapore, is how deep the public-private alliance 
goes in terms of  penetrating the government 
hierarchy. This improves information sharing and 
process coordination and makes it easier to forge 
consensus or understandings. Diagram 4 shows 
the system of  institutions created in Singapore 
for these purposes. Interaction with the private 
sector is very wide-ranging and representatives 
from firms even sit on the boards of organizations 
such as the Economic Development Board (edb), 
where the country’s development strategies have 
traditionally been produced. Furthermore, locally-
based multinationals operating in the country are 
part of the private participation, which reflects the 
importance of firms of this type in the production 
system and the priority given by the government 
to garnering international knowledge relevant to 
its strategy. In the case of the Agency for Science, 
Technology and Research (a*star), not only are 
some locally-based multinationals incorporated, but 
so are some foreign academics. Although Ireland has 
a very similar profile, the members of the different 
boards have operational responsibilities, whereas in 
Singapore they only comment on and periodically 
evaluate policies and programmes.
In Singapore, and to a lesser extent in Ireland 
and Malaysia, there is another form of public-private 
DIAGRAM 3
Public-private alliances: positioning of countries
Source: Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky, “Fomentando tigres latinoamericanos: principios para una visión estratégica 
nacional en el marco de alianzas públicas-privadas”, Santiago, Chile, 2009, unpublished.
17 The unions in Singapore have an institutional relationship of 
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alliance: international panels of  advisers like 
those for the Economic Development Board and 
the Infocomm Development Authority (ida) 
(see diagram 4). In addition, the Development 
Board, which traditionally spearheaded both the 
formulation and the implementation of development 
strategies,18 organizes a private meeting of  the 
highest political level every year, whose conclusions 
are announced in a press release. This is attended 
by invited ceos of major multinationals and local 
government representatives who analyse trends in 
globalization and in the South-East Asia region as 
well as changes in technology and trade patterns. 
This is not just a forum for sharing information 
applicable to national strategies; it also serves to 
create a network of  contacts in the international 
market whereby concrete opportunities for the 
country can be identified.19 The same procedure, 
DIAGRAM 4
Singapore: public-private boards of institutions
supporting international trade and investment
Source: Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky, “Fomentando tigres latinoamericanos: principios para una visión estratégica 
nacional en el marco de alianzas públicas-privadas”, Santiago, Chile, 2009, unpublished.
18 Innovation agencies have since taken over this role.
19 Another attraction of this meeting from the point of view of 
general managers of  multinationals can be the opportunity it 
provides to learn about issues relating to East Asia.
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but in the academic realm, is followed by a*star, 
which has included a number of Nobel laureates and 
operates in the context of  the National Research 
Foundation (nrf), a body that leads innovation 
strategy and implementation.20 In 2005, Malaysia 
also formed an international group of  advisers 
to support formulation of its latest national plan. 
With similar characteristics to that of  Singapore, 
it drew in leading personalities from academia and 
the private sector.
The public-private alliance of  Ireland is 
embodied in a special council, chaired by the 
Taoiseach (prime minister), which regularly convenes 
representatives of the major social groups and, with 
technical support, engages in discussions to reach 
consensus on the future socio-economic direction of 
the country (see section V). This council is believed to 
have been critical to the success of the Irish alliance 
and economic model. Finland has its Science and 
Technology Policy Council (stpc), which serves the 
same purpose.
Australia and New Zealand can be seen as 
intermediate cases in the diagram 3 classification. 
Rather than consensus, the character of  their 
respective public-private alliances depends on 
coalitions based on the political platforms of 
governments. In Australia, the alliance is mainly 
between the government, firms and academia, 
although changes are likely following the recent 
election of a government with ties to labour. New 
Zealand had an alliance with firms and academia 
until 1999, when a new government brought in labour 
representatives and paid them greater attention. 
The structure predominating in both alliances is 
“fluid”, which partly reflects a degree of hostility to 
corporatism, albeit for different reasons. In Australia, 
the government until recently maintained a highly 
orthodox position; in New Zealand, following a 
long period of  very liberal economic policies, the 
government had great difficulty establishing a social 
consensus that would allow it to enlist the business 
sector and political opposition in the construction 
of an Irish-style model of  alliances, collaboration 
and proactive economic transformation (Haworth, 
2008). The hybrid structure of the country’s public-
private alliance was not stable or well-coordinated 
enough to generate lasting national consensus on a 
comprehensive structural strategy transcending the 
electoral cycle. This partly explains why progress has 
been slow and incomplete in New Zealand despite 
the launching of  two complementary medium- 
and long-term strategic economic transformation 
initiatives, leading to great uncertainty.21 The fact 
is that the alliances of these two countries, both of 
them situated in Area 2 of diagram 3, are not clearly 
consolidated, which explains the lack of consensus 
or more solid public understandings.22
The Czech Republic is also in Area 2 of 
diagram 3. The country has formal, structured forums 
with broad participation and vigorous interaction 
between the public and private sectors in both the 
design and implementation of  national strategies. 
However, their input into decision-making has 
depended greatly on the ideology of  the different 
governing coalitions that have held power during 
the democratization period.23
In Spain it proved possible to build a consensus 
around the country’s national development strategy 
during the process of democratization and integration 
into the European Union by means of  forums, 
committees and working groups, among other things. 
At present, the dominant form of interaction in the 
alliance between central government and specialized 
organizations is informal in nature and takes place 
mainly with unions and business groupings, some 
of  the latter with support from the public sector, 
which also provides part of their financing.24 From 
this it can be deduced that Spain probably belongs 
in Area 1 of diagram 3. In Sweden, a country where 
there is consensus, it is not very easy to describe how 
the public-private alliance works, given its markedly 
informal and tacit character.25
20 The private-sector representatives on the boards of the nrf  and 
the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council (riec), to which 
it reports, are all Singaporean.
21 See Office of  the Prime Minister (2002) and Ministry of 
Economic Development (2005). An election in late 2008 was won 
by the conservative opposition. It remains to be seen whether there 
will be continuity in the economic transformation strategy.
22 There is a fairly solid public-private alliance in the area of 
innovation, but the relevant government agencies are not well 
articulated with a global scheme for the overall direction of the 
economy.
23 The insistence of the European Union on conducting a broad 
social dialogue on the use of  cooperation funding has been a 
positive factor for public-private alliances.
24 In Andalusia the alliance is structured and formal and is 
mostly a three-way affair; the private sector is not so proactive, 
however.
25 In Sweden there was a tacit alliance between government and 
major Swedish multinationals, and until recently there were also 
formal wage agreements between the government and unions.
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At the other extreme are the Republic of 
Korea and the Czech Republic before the 1990s. 
Both countries belong in the bottom left-hand 
corner of diagram 3 (Area 4), with strategies being 
formulated and implemented almost exclusively 
by government and its specialists. Naturally, the 
Czech Republic did not really have a private sector 
at that time. In the case of the Republic of Korea, 
prior to democratization the practice was to design 
specific plans regulating the activities of the major 
industrial conglomerates (chaebols), based on a 
close relationship between the public and private 
sectors and a wide range of incentives and penalties 
applied unilaterally to firms.26 Because it now has a 
quite sophisticated economy, however, the country 
has abandoned national planning and the chaebols 
have a great deal of  commercial independence. 
Since the advent of democracy, the government has 
increasingly come to appreciate the valuable role the 
alliance between the public and private sectors can 
play in supporting strategies; nonetheless, dialogue is 
only incipient. As for the Czech Republic, although it 
now has appropriate structures in place, the relevance 
and strength of its public-private alliance depends, 
as already mentioned, on political coalitions. An 
economic transformation project arose in the first 
half  of the 2000s but weakened in 2007 following 
the election of a conservative government.
Lastly, the public-private alliances that are 
most complete and most effective at supporting 
medium- and long-term development strategies 
with enough public consensus or understanding to 
prevent pendulum swings are to be found in Finland, 
Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, Spain and Sweden. 
The least solid or effective are those of Australia, 
the Czech Republic and New Zealand. The Republic 
of  Korea, meanwhile, is still in transition from a 
bureaucratic development model to a more open 
social model.
3. Consensus-building
Long-term strategies based on a high degree of 
consensus between the public and private sectors 
can give better results, not least because consensus 
helps ensure the survival and stability of strategies 
across electoral cycles, encourages stakeholders to 
participate in their development and provides an 
implicit public verdict on their effectiveness and 
on the public policies associated with them. More 
important still is the fact that processes oriented 
towards building consensus around a particular 
strategy can mobilize and incorporate the best 
information, perspectives and capabilities available 
in the country, while also making it more likely that 
stable funding commitments will be secured for the 
priorities agreed on.
Unfortunately, consensus-building is not easy. It 
depends on factors as diverse as cultural inclinations, 
political structures and configurations, the power 
of  different social groups, the leadership, vision, 
representativeness and public standing of  social 
partners, the successes achieved and the degree 
of  urgency perceived.27 Nonetheless, institutional 
frameworks that are properly structured to reflect 
the country’s socio-political characteristics can also 
help to create consensus over time.
Ireland is an interesting case study. The country 
was one of the poorest in Europe, but from the late 
1980s onward it succeeded in building a consensus 
about its development and its place in the international 
economy, triggering one of  the most remarkable 
economic transformations anywhere in the world since 
the post-war period. One particular body, the National 
Economic and Social Council (nesc) has played a 
vital role in concerting economic policy agreements 
over a number of decades. The Council was originally 
a public-private forum where representatives of the 
main social groups met to exchange views, but its role 
has gradually changed to one of facilitating consensus 
on the general orientation of the economy. As it has 
evolved, it has also developed a methodology for 
processing this dialogue so that it yields consensus-
based policies (see section V). It should be noted that 
the formulation of medium- and long-term strategies, 
embodied in Irish national plans, predated by over 
two decades the fuller national consensus achieved in 
the late 1980s following a period of economic crisis. 
The fact that there was already an effective forum 
where problems could be discussed constructively 
made it easier to reach agreement on an economic 
transformation strategy.
26 See Evans (1995), Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990).
27 A fairly common factor in the countries selected is that a 
consensus or understanding has often emerged in a situation of 
crisis. One obstacle to New Zealand adopting a more structuralist 
strategy was satisfaction at the country’s “respectable” rates of 
natural resource-based growth, even though they were not enough 
for convergence.
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Consensus arrived at through collective action 
has the advantages already discussed, but can also 
entail risks that manifest themselves as rigidity in 
the application of  strategies and programmes.28 
However, certain characteristics of  the National 
Economic and Social Council come close to the ideal, 
especially as regards the way its strategic evaluations 
of  the country’s environment avoid “lock-in”. As 
an Australian expert has pointed out (Marsh, 2006) 
in a more general analysis dealing with the subject 
of  consensus, these characteristics are as follows: 
(i) the ability to make existing understandings 
more stable, (ii) the application of mechanisms to 
reconcile different viewpoints, (iii) an institutional 
framework that consistently facilitates the study 
and resolution of problems, (iv) an environment in 
which the boundaries between political disciplines 
and the expectations of different social stakeholders 
can be transcended and (v) the ability to build new 
political coalitions and networks.
In the construction of what prove to be more 
durable strategy-forming consensuses, like those 
of  Ireland and Finland, and likewise in the case 
of  understandings such as those of  Malaysia and 
Singapore, there is an explicit concern to make social 
cohesion part of the process, as this is an important 
factor for the full incorporation of civil society. In 
addition, public-private alliances are presided over 
by the country’s highest authorities, such as the 
president or prime minister.
Although consensus is undoubtedly difficult 
to attain, high-level forums and meetings that are 
attended by the public and private sectors, are geared 
towards solving problems and reaching agreements, 
are isolated to some extent from day-to-day 
political confrontation and are grounded in analyses 
based on real facts can be a good mechanism for 
achieving social consensus on a national economic 
transformation and internationalization strategy that 
is sustainable in the medium and long run.
V
An example of a far-reaching public-private 
alliance: the case of ireland29
1. Structure and operations
The National Economic and Social Council of 
Ireland came into being in the early 1960s as a 
talking shop for employers’ associations, unions, 
farmers’ organizations and very high-level public-
sector officials (it now includes non-governmental 
organizations). Its original purpose was to provide 
a forum where groupings and organizations with 
different interests could exchange views on the 
country’s economic and social development. In 
the 1970s and 1980s the nesc served as a non-
confrontational discussion forum, but after the 
crisis of  the second half  of  the 1980s and the 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, recession and 
unemployment that ensued, it evolved into a place 
where social understandings and agreements could 
be reached within the framework of an economic 
policy focused on high and sustained economic 
growth with social equity.
The Council now analyses strategic medium- 
and long-term economic issues and advises the 
Taoiseach (prime minister) on policy and programme 
guidelines. It is chaired by the Secretary-General of 
the Department of the Taoiseach and its members 
include the secretaries-general of certain ministries 
and five representatives from each of the following 
groups: employers’ associations, unions, farmers’ 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
independent representatives (usually specialists or 
academics). The government invites nominations 
for representatives of  the social groups and itself  
appoints the independent participants, who share 
29 This section is based on the study carried out by O’Donovan 
(2008).
28 Another risk is the “capture” of the State already referred to. 
This can be mitigated by ensuring that the forum is representative 
and by means of codes of conduct, evaluations and transparency 
(O’Donovan, 2008).
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its outlook to some degree. Appointments are for 
three-year terms.
The nesc receives technical and administrative 
advice from a semi-autonomous secretariat with nine 
members (most of  them specialists with master’s 
degrees or doctorates) responsible for preparing studies 
to support its deliberations. Its director is a politically 
impartial and widely respected economist and its 
staff  are selected by competitive examination and 
appointed by the State on a temporary basis. In 2007, 
the secretariat had a budget of 1.1 million euros.
The Council meets once a month and decisions 
are taken by consensus. It prepares a triennial report 
which is used as a strategic input for negotiations on 
the social agreement between the government, firms 
and unions, and as a guide for the government’s 
national plan. The activities of  the nesc began 
to be consolidated in 1986, when it was able to 
lay the groundwork for conversations between 
the government and different social stakeholders 
that resulted in a three-year agreement on wages, 
taxes and social spending as part of a programme 
of  growth, employment and fiscal equilibrium. 
Once the situation of  macroeconomic imbalance 
had been dealt with, subsequent reports focused 
on other strategic issues such as competitiveness, 
the supply of  industrial goods and services and 
the knowledge economy, all on the basis of social 
cohesion policies.30
2. The consensus-building methodology
The discussions of  the National Economic and 
Social Council of Ireland do not focus on short-term 
issues. Instead, it formulates recommendations based 
on the broad principles framing the government’s 
medium- and long-term socio-economic policies and 
programmes. The goal is to attain consensus within 
an analytical framework that makes it possible to 
forge a social agreement, orient a national strategy 
and incorporate government programmes into the 
national plan. The type of  public-private alliance 
associated with the Council consists mainly of  a 
process of  consultation and agreement between 
partners united by functional interdependence and a 
sense of solidarity, social cohesion and participation. 
Both facets are indispensable to the process, since 
depending exclusively on the former would give 
too much importance to the relative power of the 
partners, while relying solely on the latter would 
reduce the concept of inclusion to nothing more than 
a consultation exercise in which the interested parties 
merely made known their views and needs.
There is a third important aspect, however: 
negotiation. Consensus-building implies that the 
partners do not come to the table with hard-and-
fast positions or a determination to maximize the 
benefits to themselves, but rather are willing to 
follow a process of  deliberation that provides an 
opportunity to formulate and reformulate agreement 
on particular problems and their solutions as well as 
on the identities and preferences of the participants, 
the end result being the creation of  something 
akin to a public good. Thus, the alliance-building 
process depends on the ability to work towards 
understanding and enter into deliberations with a 
view to solving a concrete problem in a way that 
yields consensus.
The key to the nesc process may be the method 
of deliberation. The first step is to accept that the 
essential mandate of  the participants is to solve 
problems, while the second key point is that the 
deliberation mechanism is designed to do so through 
dialogue based on inputs from neutral experts 
and working groups that help to create common 
positions. The characteristic of  this mode of 
operating is that the debate among the participants 
does not turn on a definitive point of view; instead, 
following consideration of  the empirical evidence 
presented by a neutral technical secretary, and in 
compliance with the problem-solving mandate, a sort 
of “joint decision” can emerge. The participants are 
obliged to explain, justify and accept responsibility 
for their proposals vis-à-vis the evidence, their 
partners in the alliance, their own members and the 
general public. Thus, understanding and consensus 
are not a precondition for the alliance, but an 
outcome of it.
Another important element in consensus-
building is social cohesion, a permanent goal of 
deliberations on the direction and content of future 
strategies. The experience of the National Economic 
and Social Council reveals that a pragmatic discussion 
aimed at solving a concrete problem can produce 
consensus, even when there are underlying conflicts 
of interest and no initial understanding. It should 
be noted that consensuses achieved at the nesc 
30 For more detailed information, see the web page of the Government 
of  Ireland [online] http://www.irlgov.ie/ and the nesc web page 
[online] http://www.nesc.ie.
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are always temporary, i.e., they serve to formulate 
practical recommendations for action, but goals, 
methods and analyses can always be revisited.
The deliberations of  the Council are private 
and are supported by the Taoiseach. The actors 
involved vary depending on the issues at stake, 
which makes consensus easier to achieve. Something 
else that contributes to this is a forward-looking 
approach, which makes government representatives 
less defensive. As we have said, the nesc only makes 
recommendations based on the main thrust of 
medium- and long-term government socio-economic 
policies and programmes, and they are not binding. 
Nonetheless, the strategic reports of  the Council 
have provided the basic input for negotiations 
on the socio-economic programmes of  the social 
agreement that are held in the Taoiseach’s cabinet, 
and have been very influential in the preparation of 
the national plan.
Lastly, it must be remembered that the good 
results achieved by the nesc and its methodology 
are the outcome of  a long process of  trial and 
error beginning several decades ago, thanks to the 
decision by the public sector to offer interested social 
groups the chance to participate in a neutral high-
level three-way forum backed by the Taoiseach and 
supported by high-quality technical inputs, so that 
different viewpoints on the country’s development 
could be analysed in private.
One concrete example of the nesc methodology 
are the deliberations on the national recovery strategy 
applied in 1986, when there was an urgent need to 
stabilize the economy. The problem was analysed 
intensively at the monthly meetings of the Council 
under the guidance of its chairman and on the basis 
of studies prepared by the secretariat. A vital element 
in reaching an understanding was the switch of focus 
from the annual fiscal deficit to the debt-to-gdp 
ratio, which opened the way for a more constructive 
exchange of views. First of all, it was observed that 
despite public spending cuts the fiscal situation was 
continuing to worsen, while the historically high 
global interest rates of the time were making debt 
service expensive; accordingly, it was concluded that 
the multi-year build-up of debt was more important 
than the fiscal deficit in a given year. Secondly, it 
was established that the crisis in Ireland went deeper 
than the fiscal deterioration and originated in the 
impaired growth rate of  the economy. It was also 
concluded that this mediocre performance was due 
not just to the macroeconomic problem, but to the 
country’s development style as well. In addition to 
formulating macroeconomic recommendations, the 
Council emphasized the challenge of development 
and economic transformation, i.e., the need to 
create comparative advantages in areas other than 
agriculture. To implement policies in this sector, 
primary constraints were also analysed and industrial 
policies recommended to deal with them. Following 
the return to a situation of macroeconomic balance, 
this latter aspect of the nesc approach was given 
even greater prominence in the reports.31
VI
Conclusions
The current financial crisis represents a new 
challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean that 
will need to be confronted by means of short-term 
adjustments, but also within the framework of  a 
proactive strategy for productive transformation 
and insertion into the international economy in the 
medium and long terms. In this way the region will 
improve its positioning in the global market and will 
be able to take advantage of the renewal of growth 
in the world economy, avoiding the contradictions 
observed in the adjustments of the 1980s.
The study on which this article is based showed 
how some successful countries from outside the region 
had managed to substantially increase and sustain 
their growth rates, thereby closing or significantly 
narrowing the per capita income gap with the rich 
countries over the long run, and identified a set of 
common characteristics that influenced this process. 
The present article focuses on two of  these: the 
importance of  a strategic forward-looking vision 
31 See Caillaud and Tirole (2007) for an analysis of the dynamic 
of  different consensus-building strategies. See Prats i Català 
(2005) for information on leadership, dialogue, consensus and 
representative groups.
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and public-private collaboration or alliances to deal 
with problems consensually and decide on strategies 
for solving them.32
It was observed that the key is to organize a 
representative social process within a framework 
of  alliances that facilitate an intelligent national 
effort to identify opportunities for accelerating the 
country’s economic transformation and dynamizing 
the mode of its international insertion, coupled with 
identification of  short-, medium- and long-term 
constraints and the capacity of the private and public 
sectors to remove or alleviate them so that the goals 
set can be achieved. The design of the social process 
is crucial here: it needs to be socially inclusive and 
representative and supported at the highest political 
level, and it must not result in the capture of the State 
by special interests. Its mode of operation should 
be conducive to objective, empirically grounded 
diagnostic work, as this will make it easier to reach 
consensus on where the economy ought to be 
internationally in five, 10 or 15 years’ time and on 
the measures needed to attain goals that are realistic 
but also ambitious.
The study shows how the different countries 
were able to fulfil these requirements each in their 
own way, given that there is no universal formula. 
Nonetheless, the most successful were those with 
more stable public-private alliances that provided 
a basis for consensus or public understandings 
to underpin economic transformation strategies 
oriented towards successful internationalization of 
the economy.
There is a growing interest in developing 
economic transformation strategies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and the seeds of public-private 
alliances to sustain them already exist in several 
countries. However, according to the results of the 
authors’ research published originally in eclac 
(2008c) and of a forthcoming study by them (Devlin 
and Moguillansky, 2009), there is still a long way to 
go in terms of designing and implementing strategies 
and developing effective alliances to support them.
As regards strategies, a significant number have 
been documented whose contents largely consist of a 
set of fairly general aspirations for the development 
of  a modern, competitive economy, but which 
are not complete enough to express effective and 
properly financed plans of action. Recognizing that 
strategy and actions plus financing and public-sector 
organizing ability are the four indispensable elements 
for achieving these aspirations, the efforts made 
often fail to yield the desired results. This is because 
strategies have a very wide range of broad goals, giving 
rise in turn to a proliferation of unquantifiable targets 
and actions for which no deadlines or accountability 
exist. At best, they represent conceptual frameworks 
rather than strategies as such.
What we consider true alliances are those 
which give rise to a consensual vision transcending 
political cycles and where the public sector has the 
ability to be a credible partner of the private sector, 
i.e., can effectively implement the actions needed to 
carry forward a strategy that provides the basis for 
rapid economic transformation. Inevitably, all this 
has to be achieved through a social and political 
process of trial and error. But the goal is clear: to 
begin constructing an effective strategic approach 
to public policymaking that can contribute to the 
development of Latin American “tigers”.
(Original: Spanish)
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